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The British decision to withdraw from the European Union makes it necessary to renegotiate 
trade relations between the EU and the United Kingdom from scratch. At the same 
time the trade agreements that the EU has concluded with non-EU states will no 
longer apply to the UK. 
 
 
There has been a great deal of speculation about 
how Brexit will work in practice. After the speech 
by Theresa May, the British prime minister, at the 
Tory party congress in Birmingham on 2 October 
2016, it now seems clear that in March 2017 the 
UK will officially notify the European Union of its 
intention to withdraw and will set in motion the 
“breakup” procedure provided for in Article 50 of 
the Treaty of Lisbon. Thus the UK has just about 
two years in which to negotiate the terms of the 
divorce. However, these negotiations do not 
cover the way in which the UK and the EU will 
interact after deciding to go their separate ways, 
or the contractual basis on which they intend to 
build their relationship. It seems likely that the 
UK will come down in favour of a “hard” Brexit 
solution and will not be prepared to accept any 
EU restrictions on its sovereignty. Thus, unlike 
Norway and Liechtenstein, which are linked to 
the EU via the European Economic Area (EEA), 
or Switzerland, which is tied to the EU by a mesh 
of bilateral agreements, the UK would proceed to 
sever all of its links with the EU internal market. 
The ways in which the UK and the EU intend to 
trade with each other in future, the tariffs, and 
various kinds of trade facilitation will have to be 
renegotiated from scratch. Furthermore, UK 
withdrawal from the EU means that trade 
agreements concluded by the EU within the 
framework of the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) and bilateral trade agreements with non-
EU states will no longer apply to the UK. In order 
to be able to trade under the conditions that 
prevailed in the EU, the UK will have to 
renegotiate all of the EU trade agreements now 
in existence. 
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We asked Professor Stefan Oeter, a well-known 
expert in the field of international trade law, to tell 
us what, under these circumstances, the future 
trade and economic relations between the UK 
and the EU in particular, and with the world in 
general are going to look like. 
 
What kind of status will the UK have after 
withdrawal from the EU when it comes to 
trade issues? Do the WTO rules 
automatically apply to the UK, and which 
goods and services that are of 
importance for the UK economy do they 
cover? 
In principle the status of trade links between the 
UK and the EU will be determined by the 
provisions of the withdrawal agreement specified 
in Article 50 TEU. Paragraph 2 of the withdrawal 
article expressly states that the withdrawal 
agreement shall take into account “the 
framework for its future relationship with the 
Union.” In the event of a “hard” Brexit and in the 
absence of special agreements on trade 
relations, economic links between the UK and 
the EU would return to the level of the basic 
standards of WTO law. As a result of ratifying the 
WTO treaty as a mixed agreement the UK is 
already a member of the WTO in formal terms. 
Withdrawal means that trade links between the 
EU and the UK, and between the UK and non-
EU states which are members of the WTO will 
automatically be subject to WTO disciplines. 
However, the UK does not as yet have its own 
schedule of tariff concessions since this area is 
covered by the schedule of tariff concessions 
jointly submitted by all of the EU member states. 
In this context the UK will have to adjust 
numerous technical provisions, since the 
common EU tariffs, which are stipulated in the 
EU schedule of tariff concessions, will have to be 
transferred to a new UK schedule of tariff 
concessions. In the course of this process it will 
be necessary to make numerous modifications, 
and in the final analysis these will require the 
approval of the other contracting parties. It might 
be possible to apply the usual EU tariffs to the 
UK’s trade with the EU and the UK’s trade with 
non-EU states, at least for a transitional period. 
In the context of transfer and adjustment the UK 
would not be allowed to raise tariffs to the 
detriment of other contracting partners. It would 
simply create even more problems as a result of 
the WTO rules. Thus the external tariff as 
specified in the GATT (General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade) schedule of concessions 
would also apply to the relationship between the 
EU and the UK (as a non-member state). 
 
In my opinion leaving the customs union and 
applying EU external tariffs to trade in goods 
would not constitute an insurmountable problem, 
for the tariffs that apply to most of the various 
types of goods are fairly low. However, there are 
exceptions as in the area of trade with 
agricultural products, and the automotive 
industry, where rather high tariffs are still in 
place. Under the WTO rules the UK would have 
a massive problem with the services sector. 
GATS, the WTO services sector agreement, has 
hitherto led to no more than a trickle of 
liberalization. It is of course true that the financial 
services sector, which is of particular importance 
for the UK, is one of the few areas in which 
agreement has been reached on a (limited) 
number of important market access issues. 
However, these still lag a very long way behind 
the completely open internal market for services 
in the EU. Thus the City of London with its high-
powered and high-turnover financial services 
companies would find the question of market 
access in sensitive areas to a rather difficult 
issue. Furthermore, in the UK services are of 
especial importance for the balance of trade, 
whereas in the area of goods there is a massive 
imbalance in trade with the EU. 
 
What does this mean for EU-UK 
relations? Would the UK in future be 
content to trade with the EU on the basis 
of WTO rules? Would it also be in the 
interests of the EU? 
As the House of Lords noted on 13 December 
2016 in its most recent report on Brexit, a trade 
regime based solely on WTO rules would not be 
very satisfactory as far as the UK is concerned. 
The flow of imports from the EU would be 
unimpeded, whereas the high-powered British 
services sector would find it rather difficult to gain 
the market access that it needs. The UK will 
have to try to secure a more broadly-based 
(contractual) free trade regime which also takes 
in the services sector. These negotiations will 
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demonstrate that the interests of the two sides 
are very dissimilar. The UK must do everything it 
can to obtain special access rights for its 
services sector, whereas the EU will probably be 
far less interested in this topic. As a kind of quid 
pro quo it will be tempting to make concessions 
in the services sector dependent on British 
concessions in the area of the free movement of 
people. From a purely economic point of view 
this is not absolutely necessary. Most 
economists are of the opinion that there is no 
compelling economic reason why there should 
be a link between the services sector and 
freedom of movement. However, in political 
terms it will be well-nigh impossible to jettison the 
links between the two freedoms, which after all 
are an essential feature of the EU project. It is to 
be hoped that political good sense will gain the 
upper hand, and that the link between the 
services sector and freedom of movement is not 
overdone. In political terms unreasonable 
concessions in the area of freedom of movement 
will be virtually impossible to sell to Brexit 
supporters in the UK. If it acquiesced to such 
demands, the British government would feel 
compelled to make massive sacrifices in the 
services sector, and this would have a very 
negative impact on the economy. 
 
What in point of fact are the various 
options available to the UK as it tries to 
reshape its trade relations? It is true that 
the UK is still the fifth most important 
economic power in the world, but is that 
enough to enable it to negotiate 
advantageous trade agreements with the 
U.S., the EU, China and India? What in 
your opinion is the most likely scenario, 
and are you in a position to predict how 
the British economy will now develop? 
The withdrawal agreement is supposed to outline 
the UK’s relationship with the EU, and here there 
are a number of quite different options. As we 
have seen, reverting to a trade regime based 
solely on WTO rules would not be particularly 
advantageous to the UK. Conversely, a de facto 
incorporation in the internal market via EEA 
membership would be difficult to sell to the UK 
electorate in political terms, since it would mean 
subservience to the legislative powers of EU 
institutions, and the far-reaching acceptance of 
the free of movement of people. When all is said 
and done there is still, as in the case of 
Switzerland, the option of negotiating (limited) 
access to the internal market and the common 
legal space via bilateral agreements. In terms of 
the negotiating process such agreements are 
very time-consuming and cannot really solve the 
problem of the political links between access to 
the internal market and freedom of movement 
which are so difficult to sever. Switzerland is 
currently experiencing this with regard to the 
implementation of the so-called “mass 
immigration initiative” of 2014. The Swiss 
Federal Council and the Swiss Parliament have 
decided to back a very much watered-down 
version of the implementation procedure in order 
to prevent disagreements with the EU on the 
subject of freedom of movement from getting out 
of hand. A customs union–as in the case of 
Turkey–is still a possibility in the absence of 
complete freedom of movement. However, the 
kind of participation in the internal market that 
goes beyond this will entail paying a high political 
price. 
 
The situation is even more difficult when it comes 
to trade relations with non-EU states. As long as 
the United Kingdom is a member of the EU in 
formal terms ¬– and this will be the case until 
such time as the withdrawal agreement, which 
has not as yet been negotiated, enters into force 
– the UK, as stipulated in the EU treaty, is not 
permitted to negotiate its own trade agreements. 
It could of course – in so far as potential contract 
partners are prepared to do so – embark on 
informal negotiations of a preliminary nature. 
However, these can be upgraded to the level of 
formal negotiations only after withdrawal – and it 
should be remembered that such negotiations 
are very time-consuming. After withdrawal from 
the EU the UK would not in fact have free trade 
relations with any non-EU states, and its trade 
relations would be determined solely by WTO 
rules. For the British economy this would be a 
significant problem with regard to certain trading 
partners, though at present – in the absence of 
specific free trade agreements – trade relations 
with the EU’s largest partners (the U.S., China, 
India, and Japan) are based solely on WTO 
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rules. Nothing of any great importance would 
change with regard to these trade flows. 
 
Negotiating free trade and cooperation 
accords such as the CETA 
(Comprehensive Economic and Trade 
Agreement) agreement between the EU 
and Canada and the TTIP (Transatlantic 
Trade and Investment Partnership) 
agreement between the EU and the U.S. 
is difficult and very time-consuming. How 
long, do you think, will it take the EU and 
the UK to conclude a new trade 
agreement? How long, in your opinion, 
will it take the UK to renegotiate its trade 
relations so that they are to its 
advantage? 
The basic features of the EU-UK trade 
regulations that will be in force after the UK has 
withdrawn from the EU should in fact be defined 
in the withdrawal agreement as stipulated in 
Article 50 Paragraph 2, Sentence 2 TEU. Article 
50 Paragraph 3 TEU states that it shall be 
negotiated within two years after formal 
notification of the UK’s intention to withdraw from 
the EU. If the United Kingdom is a member of the 
EEA or if the customs union continues 
unchanged, this would certainly be technically 
possible in the context of the negotiations. 
However, in political terms the two options are 
extremely unlikely. The question is of no 
importance in the event of a “hard” Brexit 
solution, but it seems likely that the UK will 
attempt to secure a bilateral free trade 
agreement that will enable it as far as possible to 
obtain access to the internal market, and at the 
same time give the UK the ability to take political 
action in central areas. The time frame needed to 
negotiate such an agreement clearly exceeds the 
period of time specified in the provisions of 
Article 50 TEU. Such negotiations designed to 
determine the future relations between the EU 
and the UK would be so complex in technical 
and political terms that withdrawal on the basis of 
Article 50 TEU and negotiations about future 
trade relations will probably have to be dealt with 
separately. This will demonstrate the need for 
transitional regulations in the context of the 
withdrawal agreement. It is true that the 
provisions of Article 50 Paragraph 3 TEU 
empower the European Council to extend the 
negotiating period as long as it acts 
unanimously. However, the need for unanimity 
means that it is at the mercy of individual 
member states which may well threaten to 
exercise their veto rights. It is rather unlikely that 
the negotiations will continue for more than a few 
years. If we bear this in mind, a plausible 
scenario might be that the UK will withdraw after 
two or three years have elapsed even though it 
has proved impossible to reach agreement on 
the new regime. One would then conclude a 
withdrawal agreement consisting of purely 
technical regulations designed to facilitate the 
withdrawal (though this may be augmented by a 
number of transitional regulations relating to EU-
UK trade), and defer the negotiations on the new 
regime to a later date. This would be unwelcome 
news for the British and European economies, 
since in 2019 they would still have no clear idea 
about future economic relations and the issue of 
market access. Such uncertainty certainly 
complicates matters when it comes to long-term 
investment decisions by large multinational 
companies which are based in the UK and sell 
their products (or intend to sell their products) on 
the European market. They will probably put 
important investment decisions on ice until there 
is clarity about the future “terms of trade.” If the 
negotiations drag on, this could be detrimental to 
the British economy, at least in the medium term. 
 
There can be no doubt about the fact that the 
issue of the time frame of forthcoming 
negotiations on trade relations with non-EU 
states is even more dramatic. As we have seen, 
in formal terms these negotiations can begin only 
after the UK has withdrawn from the EU, that is, 
from 2019 onwards at the earliest. Going by 
previous negotiations of this kind, which have 
been very difficult and time-consuming, one is 
talking about time frames of five or ten years (or 
even longer). Moreover, the negotiations can 
only be conducted one after the other, for even 
now the UK has a massive human resources 
problem. After decades of EU membership 
during which trade agreements were to all intents 
and purposes negotiated by the EU Commission, 
the British government has only a handful of civil 
servants with the right kind of experience. Most 
of them will initially be needed for the 
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negotiations with the EU, which means that 
sufficient human resources for trade agreements 
with non-EU states will become available only 
after 2020. Apart from this there is a need for 
clarity with regard to market access (and tariffs) 
as defined by the WTO. This will make it possible 
to negotiate in a meaningful manner about 
greater liberalization within the framework of free 
trade agreements. And this clarity will probably 
emerge only in a few years’ time. Thus a mesh of 
trade agreements comparable to the current 
legal status will materialize after 2030 at the 
earliest. 
 
Is there a danger that the process of 
renegotiating relations between the UK 
and the EU will force the EU to defer 
other free trade agreements (e.g. with 
India, the U.S., or, in the long run, with 
China) because it simply does not have 
the resources to conclude such complex 
trade agreements at one and the same 
time?  
The EU clearly has at its disposal more of the 
right kind of staff than the member states. I 
believe it is rather unlikely that this issue will 
pose a threat to the negotiating processes of free 
trade agreements with the U.S., India and China. 
In any case it is a good idea to assess the time 
frame of such negotiations in a realistic manner. 
After the election of Donald Trump the 
agreement with the U.S. has been put on ice for 
years to come (the most optimistic scenario), and 
it is also a very controversial issue within the EU. 
As long as the EU is unable to ratify a rather 
trivial agreement (which deals with economic 
policy convergence and complementary 
economic structures) such as CETA within a 
reasonable length of time, negotiating partners of 
the calibre of India and China will continue to 
maintain a low profile. Ambitious projects such 
as “comprehensive trade agreements” are 
proving to be increasingly problematical within 
the EU, partly on account of the fact that they are 
“mixed agreements” which require the assent of 
the national parliaments. Until CETA has been 
ratified it will be difficult to conclude similar 
agreements with India or China. For this reason 
people will look carefully at the fate of the 
comprehensive trade agreement with Japan, 
which is on the verge of being finalized. An 
alternative would be to pare down the negotiating 
agenda to classical trade subjects, which would 
mean excluding investment protection and 
regulatory cooperation. Since these would be EU 
agreements pure and simple, they would be 
easier to implement in political terms, even 
though one would have to put the negotiations 
with Japan, India and China on a new footing. 
The time frame of these negotiations reaches far 
into the 2020s, which means that focusing on the 
negotiations with the UK in the next two, three or 
four years does not seem to be very 
problematical. 
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